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THE YIN AND YANG OF CORPORATIONS AND
DEMOCRACY
Franklin A. Gevurtz*
Forthcoming in the Northeastern University Law Review
These are perilous times for American democracy. Among the
threats, many point to the power of corporations. This article
examines that threat by considering a series of dualisms
characterizing the relationship between corporations and
democracy.
This begins with a look at the anti- as well as the pro-democratic
impacts of the earliest corporations and the paradoxes with respect
to democracy created during the evolution of corporate law. The
article then looks at internal corporate governance (so-called
“corporate” or “shareholder democracy”) to show how, on the one
hand, it contains features addressing some of the greatest current
threats to American democracy, while, on the other hand, it operates
as a fundamentally undemocratic vote buying system. This dualism
in internal corporate governance, in turn, reflects a clash in the
purpose for corporate or shareholder democracy: Is the purpose
economic efficiency, or is it democratic legitimacy for those
controlling the often-vast power of the corporation?
Finally, this article addresses the dualism in the internal and
external aspects of the relationship between corporations and
democracy by situating the governance and impact of corporations
within the broader democratic governance of society. Specifically,
individuals in charge of corporations lack democratic consent and
accountability for their decisions unless either internal corporate
governance is consistent with democratic values; persons without
voice through internal corporate governance can avoid the impact
of such decisions by not dealing with the corporation; or
democratically elected federal, state, and local governments can
intervene when externalities and market failures render refusal to
deal unrealistic. This, in turn, suggests the need to limit excessive
political influence by those in charge of corporations or to reform
the anti-democratic aspects of internal corporate governance.
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 3
II. THE YIN AND YANG OF CORPORATIONS AND
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I wish to
thank participants in various workshops at which I presented this article, most especially Elizabeth
Pollman and Jarrod Wong, for their helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I confess to being a fan of science fiction portraying dystopian
futures. A common trope in such fiction has powerful corporations
controlling or even constituting the government while shadowy
schemers or rich elites control the corporations.1 As with all such
fiction, this vision of the future reflects present fears. Numerous
writings both in academic2 and mainstream3 publications address the
perceived danger that powerful corporations pose to democracy.4
Unfortunately, these writings often remind one of the parable of
the blind men describing an elephant in which each description,
while accurate in its own way, misses the mark in picturing the beast
as a whole. Similarly, writings about corporations and democracy
tend to look at pieces of the topic but, in doing so, can miss the
bigger picture.

1
E.g., Incorporated (TV series), WIKIPEDIA available at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Incorporated_(TV_series) (“The series takes place in a dystopian
Milwaukee in the year 2074, where many countries have gone bankrupt due to a number of crises
and climate change. In the absence of effective government, powerful multinational corporations
have become de facto governments, controlling areas called Green Zones.”); Continuum (TV series),
WIKIPEDIA available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuum_(TV_series) (program begins “in
2077-era Vancouver under the corporatocratic and oligarchic dystopia of the North American Union
and its Corporate Congress”).
2
E.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak, CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2017); Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmueller, Taming the Corporate Leviathan: Codetermination
and the Democratic State, working paper available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3680769 (March
30, 2021); Luigi Zingales, Towards a Political Theory of the Firm, 31 J. ECON. PERS. 113 (2017);
Leo E. Strine Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts' Role in Eroding We the People's Ability to
Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423 (2016).
3
E.g., Sheldon Whitehouse & Melanie Wachtell Stinnett, CAPTURED: THE CORPORATE
INFILTRATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2017); Timothy Wu, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS:
ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018); Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered
American Democracy THE ATLANTIC (April 20, 2015).
4
This fear goes back to the founding of the republic. E.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter,
Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 894-96 (2016) (quoting early American sources, including Thomas
Jefferson, expressing concern regarding the “aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare
already to challenge our government”).
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Some writers, particularly those reacting to the Citizens United
decision,5 focus on the external to the corporation. They address
corporate influence over democratically elected governments and
the clash between government efforts to control corporations and the
assertion by corporations of free speech rights normally associated
with individuals.6 As far as the internal governance of the
corporation, it may as well be a black box in which an artificial
intelligence commands decisions designed to increase corporate
profits at the public’s expense.7
Other writers focus on the internal governance of the corporation.
Starting with the fact that the individuals legally in charge of
corporations (the members of the board of directors) are normally
elected in an ostensibly democratic process,8 these writers address
to what extent such “corporate” or “shareholder democracy” is
consistent with democratic norms, and, if not, what, if anything,
should be done about it.9 Typically unaddressed is the impact of this
issue on the broader question of whether corporations promote or
threaten democratic governance of society more generally.
Some writers address facets of the interplay between the external
impact of corporations on democracy and internal corporate
governance.10 Yet, even these writers can miss the total picture.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
E.g., Lamoreaux & Novak, supra note 2; Strine, supra note 2; Zingales, supra note 2; Daniel
H. Greenwood, Person, State or Not: The Place of Business Corporations in Our Constitutional
Order, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 351 (2016); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 217 (2010); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign
Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010).
7
A number of writers implicitly attempt to justify this approach by invoking the so-called
“shareholder primacy” norm. The argument is that we can look past the actual wishes of the human
beings making decisions for corporations because the law commands them to focus on profits for the
shareholders and nothing else. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision
Course: The Tension between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100
CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2015) (explaining the shareholder primacy norm and its impact on the use of
corporate power after Citizens United). Except in the most extreme case, however, the law in
practice does not constrain directors in their discretion to balance shareholder profits versus other
impacts of corporate activities. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real about Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Reply to Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (2002).
8
E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, CORPORATION LAW 181 (3rd ed. 2021).
9
E.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder
Primacy to Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2419 (2020); Sung Eun (Summer) Kim, DeDemocratization of Firms: A Case Study of Publicly-Listed Private Equity Firms 9 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 323 (2019); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675
(2007); Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic Democracy, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389 (2006).
10
E.g., Dammann & Eidenmueller, supra note 2 (advocating worker election of some corporate
directors to limit through “checks and balances” the threat corporations pose to democracy);
Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2016) (discussing
the challenges for internal corporate governance in deciding whether corporations should assert First
Amendment rights); David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 1197 (2011) (advocating stakeholder representation on corporate boards---albeit not
necessarily elected by the stakeholders---in order to protect the interests of corporate stakeholders
who governments fail to protect because of corporate lobbying).
5
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In fact, the interaction of the external and internal relationship
between corporations and democracy is one of a series of dualisms
in the degree to which the governance of corporations, as well as the
impact of corporations on the governance of society, advance or
threaten democratic values. Among the dualisms are pro- and antidemocratic impacts of corporations, conflicts between utilitarian
economic goals and pursuing democratic values, and the everpresent prospect for unintended consequences.
These dualisms began with the earliest business corporations,
which engaged in tyrannical governance on the Indian subcontinent
on the one hand11 but planted the seeds for democratic government
in the United States on the other.12 They extend through a
paradoxical corporate law evolution in which efforts to democratize
the use of corporations by making them easy to establish had the
impact of turning corporations into the dominant and oft-feared form
for conducting large businesses.13 At the same time, the fear of
highly successful and hence powerful corporations has collided with
the desire both for the economic growth such corporations bring, as
well as to avoid the economic dislocations caused by failed
corporations.14
Further dualism exists between pro- and anti-democratic aspects
of corporate or shareholder democracy. On the pro side, the
enforcement of corporate law by judges outside of the body politic
of any individual corporation allows corporate law to contain rules
that mitigate some of the greatest current threats to democratic
elections generally.15 Yet, shareholder democracy operates under a
fundamentally anti-democratic pay-to-play system.16 This, in turn,
reflects a dualism as to the purpose for shareholder voting: Does it
exist to establish democratic legitimacy for those controlling the
often-vast wealth and power of the corporation or is it simply a tool
to incentivize economically efficient business decisions even at the
expense of democratic values?17
This leads to the overriding dualism created by the interactions
between the internal and the external regarding the governance and
impact of corporations. A corporation (or more precisely a business
corporation) is one a number of types of institutions or associations
that compose any society and impact the lives of individuals in the

11

See text accompanying notes 28 through 31 infra.
See text accompanying notes 39 through 48 infra.
13
See text accompanying notes 52 through 64 infra.
14
See text accompanying notes 74 through 80 infra.
15
See text accompanying notes 85 through 116 infra.
16
See text accompanying notes 144 through 155 infra.
17
See text accompanying notes 156 through 190 infra.
12
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society. If the essence of democracy is the consent of,18 or
accountability to,19 the governed, one must ask what provides that
consent or accountability for those in charge of corporations (or,
indeed, those in charge of other institutions and associations). To
seek an answer, one must look not just at the internal governance of
corporations or at the external constraints placed upon corporations,
but at the interactions between both.
Consent or accountability does not exist unless those impacted by
the decisions of the individuals in charge of corporations either have
a voice through participation in the democratic election of those in
charge, can realistically refuse to associate with the corporation and
its activities (thereby denying consent or enforcing accountability
through exit20), or can count on the prospect for democratically
elected governments intervening when market failure or
externalities render non-association into an inadequate protection.
This means that excessive political influence by those in charge of
corporations---the broad policy issue overhanging Citizens United--can upset this balance for achieving democratic accountability.
This, in turn, suggests that democratic values may call for limiting
the political influence of those in charge of corporations or
rethinking the basic structure of corporate governance.
The tour through the dualisms which leads to this conclusion will
proceed as follows: Part II of this article looks at the historical
dualisms in the relationship between corporations and democracy.
Part III then focuses on the internal by examining the dualisms
underlying so-called corporate or shareholder democracy. Part IV
expands the discussion to explore the interactions between the
internal governance of the corporation and the impact of
corporations on the broader democratic governance of society and
outlines the implications of this analysis.
II. THE YIN AND YANG OF CORPORATIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN
HISTORY
From the beginning, the interactions between corporations and
democratic governance exhibited the dualisms underlying this topic.
A. Territorial Governance by Early Corporations
While the science fiction visions of government by or under the
control of powerful corporations, either in some far-off quadrant of
18

E.g., The Declaration of Independence; Virginia Declaration of Rights.
E.g., Adam Przeworski, et al, DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION (2003).
20
See, e.g., Albert O. Hirschman, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
19
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space or in a dystopian future Earth, might seem farfetched,21 it
matches the early history of the corporation. This history captures
both the prospect for corporations to serve as a source of despotic
rule or as a source for instituting democratic government. The
former involves the English East India Company, while the later
involves the companies set up to establish colonies in what would
become the United States.
1.

The Anti-Democratic History of the East India Company

The East India Company received its charter from England’s first
Queen Elizabeth at the start of the Seventeenth Century.22 This
company (along with its Dutch competitor) played an important role
in the development of what became known as a joint stock company--what we now call a business corporation in which numerous
investors purchase transferable shares of ownership in a firm
conducting a large-scale business (thereby becoming shareholders
or stockholders).23 This model for conducting business has
contributed considerably to economic growth.24 In terms of political
history, however, the East India Company’s impact was far more
negative.
From its outset, the East India Company reflected a hazy line
between private enterprise and public function. While illustrative
that the early corporate charters were granted in order to carry out
some public function beyond simply profits for shareholders,25 the
public function of the East India Company was not that noble.
Among the powers listed in its charter was “to wage war” and the
company’s trading fleet included warships.26 While the movies
might suggest a focus on pirates, the wars initially waged were
against traders from other European powers---who were using these
ventures to engage in wars by proxy.27
In the Eighteenth Century, the East India Company raised an
army and engaged in wars of conquest against the Mughal empire in
21
But see Elon Musk on planning for Mars: ‘The city has to survive if the resupply ships stop
coming from Earth’, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/09/spacex-plans-how-elon-musk-see-life-onmars.html (discussing Elon Musk’s proposal for a colony on Mars undertaken by his Space X
corporation).
22
E.g., George Cawston & A.H. Keane, THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES 87 (1896).
23
E.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci et al, The Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 193 (2017).
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5
J. ECON. HIST. 1, 22 (1945) (early corporations were created to carry out some social function of the
state).
26
E.g., William Dalrymple, The East India Company: The original corporate raiders, THE
GUARDIAN (March 4, 2015).
27
E.g., East India Company, https://theodora.com/encyclopedia/e/east_india_company.html (last
modified September 19, 2018).
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India. Military success allowed the company to pillage the Bengal
treasury---from whence the Hindustani term for pillage, “loot”,
entered the English language. The company also forced an
agreement on the local ruler for the company to supplant the Bengali
government’s role in collecting taxes (which the company’s agents
often accomplished through the use of torture).28 Heavy taxation and
the company’s prohibition on local traders maintaining rice reserves
to deal with crop failure combined with a drought a few years later
to trigger a famine in which one out of three Bengalis (more than 10
million people) died of starvation.29 Despite such costs on the local
population, by early in the Nineteenth Century, the company
controlled the Indian subcontinent with a private force twice the size
of the British army.30 It would not be until the second half of the
Nineteenth Century, after the company brutally put down a revolt
by its own private army---hanging tens of thousands of suspected
rebels in the process---that the English government decided it
needed to get control of the situation and brought India within the
British Empire.31
The company’s human rights violations were not limited to India.
When China tried to prevent sales by the company of opium
produced in Bengal, the result was the Opium Wars---China’s defeat
in which prevented China from seeking to protect its population
against addiction.32
The anti-democratic impact of the East India Company extended
to England itself. Showing that wealthy corporations can gain
influence without engaging in expensive modern political
campaigns featuring TV advertisements, the East India Company
held considerable sway over the English Parliament---one quarter of
whose members at various points owned stock in the company.33
This proved handy when, a few years after its stock price soared by
virtue of the pillage of the Bengal treasury, a dramatic shortfall in
company revenues from Bengal resulted from ruinous taxation and
famine in the province. This threatened the ability of the company
to pay its debts, and, in turn, led to the collapse of banks across
Europe. A government bailout followed.34
2.

28

The Democratic Legacy of the American Colonial
Companies

E.g., Dalrymple, supra note 26.
E.g., Zingales, supra note 2 at 116.
30
E.g., Dalrymple, supra note 26.
31
Id.
32
E.g., Soutik Biswas, How Britain's opium trade impoverished Indians,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49404024 (September 5, 2019).
33
E.g., Dalrymple, supra note 26.
34
Id.
29
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Before dismissing corporations as having had an entirely
negative impact on democratic governance, it is worthwhile to look
at American history and ask where some of our democratic
traditions originated. In fact, most of the thirteen colonies that
became the original United States began as corporations.35 While
the operations of these corporations often included what we would
now regard as egregious violations of human rights, 36 these
corporations also laid a foundation for democratic government in the
United States.
One component of democratic governance in the United States is
the existence of a written constitution.37 Scholars recognize that the
experience with written corporate charters, which outlined the
governance structure for companies establishing colonies in North
America, played a central role in the American penchant for written
constitutions.38
More broadly, the corporations that created the American
colonies played a significant role in the establishment of
representative democracy in this country. The high school version
of U.S. history points to the Virginia House of Burgesses called in
1619 as the first example of representative government among the
colonists in what would become the United States.39 This
development, however, occurred within the context of the
governance of the corporations establishing the Virginia and other
colonies in North America.
Early in the 1600s, James I granted charters for two companies to
establish colonies in what would become the United States: in the
south, what was known as the London or Virginia Company, and in
the north, the Plymouth Company.40 The original charter of the
London Company departed from the normal governance model for
chartered companies insofar as James attempted to preserve power
for himself to appoint the governing councils for the company (one
in London and a local one in Virginia). This was soon supplanted by
35
E.g., Nicholas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1407
(2017).
36
Slavery and the theft of land from the indigenous population.
37
Of course, England’s development into a democracy based upon norms and traditions forming
an unwritten constitution, coupled with the existence of numerous autocratic regimes established
under written constitutions, raise the question as to how much a written constitution really
contributes to democracy.
38
Bowie, supra note 35; William C. Morey, The Genesis of a Written Constitution 1 ANN.
AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 529 (1890).
39
E.g., Joshua J. Mark. House of Burgesses, WORLD HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.worldhistory.org/House_of_Burgesses/ (Last modified February 24, 2021).
40
E.g., 2 John P. Davis, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF
GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 158-59
(1905). London and Plymouth referred to where the organizers of the companies were from.

10
a charter establishing the more customary corporate governance
model of periodic assemblies by the members of the company (those
who we would now refer to as shareholders), who elected a governor
and a board of assistants (what we would now refer to as a board of
directors).41
This more democratic governance, however, occurred only in
England, leaving the actual colony in Virginia under the control of
a governor appointed by the shareholders in England rather than the
colonists in Virginia. Tensions set off by this scheme resulted in the
company establishing the House of Burgesses consisting of
representatives sent from the plantations and towns in Virginia. The
company codified this into a permanent arrangement in an ordinance
the company adopted in 1621.42 Views vary as to whether the
company based this representative scheme on the English
Parliament or on its own governing structure with its elected board.43
In either event, representative democracy in the United States gets it
start in decisions by a corporation.
The corporate origins of American democracy took a somewhat
different route in the north. As a result of various machinations, the
Plymouth Company granted to a group forming the Massachusetts
Bay Company some of the Plymouth Company’s land.44 The charter
forming the Massachusetts Bay Company incorporated the same
essential governance structure as the London Company and other
chartered companies---periodic assemblies of the members to elect
a board of assistants (directors) and a governor.45 There was one
critical difference: The charter did not require the assemblies of the
membership and the elected assistants to be in England.
Accordingly, the members of the Massachusetts Bay Company--who were using the company structure to further a religious and
political agenda and accordingly consisted of members in the
Puritan church---met in Massachusetts.46 As a result, the elected
governing board of the Massachusetts Bay Company became, in
effect, the Massachusetts colonial legislature.
The corporate charter for the Massachusetts Bay Company
remained the governing constitution for the Massachusetts colony
until 1691, when a new royal charter for the colony replaced the
Massachusetts Bay Company’s corporate charter. The 1691 charter,
however, preserved the existing governance structure, except that
41

E.g., Id; Morey, supra note 38 at 538-541.
E.g., Id at 541-2.
Id at 543.
44
E.g., Bowie, supra note 35 at 1413-14.
45
E.g., Morey, supra note 38 at 549.
46
E.g., Bowie, supra note 35 at 1418-20.
42
43
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the king thereafter appointed the colony’s governor.47 While James
dissolved the London Company in 1624, the governance structure in
Virginia established by the company’s 1621 ordinance remained and
later served as a model for other colonies in Maryland and the
Carolinas. The governance structure established by the
Massachusetts Bay Company’s 1628 charter provided a model for
other colonies in Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire.48
3.

Finding the Difference in the Internal versus the External

While it might be tempting to see the difference between the East
India Company versus the London and Massachusetts Bay
Companies as simply showing that the managers of some companies
are evil and others are more well behaved, there is a more useful
way to look at this. All of these companies followed an elected
governance structure providing democratic accountability to their
members. The difference arose in democratic accountability to those
who had not invested in the companies.
While the East India Company’s management was accountable
to the shareholders in England through the shareholders’ right to
elect the company’s governing board,49 there was no such
accountability to those governed by the company in India or
impacted by the company’s activities in China. By contrast, a key
moment for democracy in what would become the United States was
the London and Massachusetts Bay Companies’ export of their own
elected governance structure for use by the colonists in North
America.50 No doubt, the identity of the colonists in North America
as English was critical to this different treatment.51 All told, the
examples of territorial governance by early corporations illustrate
the dualism inherent in the internal and external aspects of the
relationship between corporations and democracy.
B. A Pair of Incorporation Paradoxes
1.

47

The Easy Formation Paradox

E.g., Morey, supra note 38 at 550.
Id at 544, 550, 552.
49
See, e.g., Cawston & Keane, supra note 27 at 87 (describing governance provisions in the East
India Company charter).
50
It should be mentioned that these representative institutions reflected the cramped view of
democracy of their time: The Virginia House of Burgesses was elected by property owning white
males and membership in the Massachusetts Bay Company was only for members of the Puritan
church.
51
See, e.g., Bowie supra note 35 at 1417-18 (charters of the Massachusetts Bay and other
colonial companies commonly contained clauses granting Britons living under the corporation’s
jurisdiction “all liberties and immunities of free and natural subjects” to reassure potential emigrants
that living overseas would not make their families’ legal status any worse than if they stayed at
home).
48
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The evolution of corporate law illustrates further dualism
regarding the relationships between corporations and democracy. To
begin with, one might ask why, if corporations pose such a potential
threat to democracy, they are so easy to form. In fact, this is the
result of a legal evolution designed to promote democratic values.
The earlier discussion of the East India Company and of the
companies forming colonies in America referred to charters granted
by Elizabeth I and James I, which established these corporations.
This is because, for most of their history, corporations came into
existence through a one-off act of the sovereign (decree by the
monarch or bill enacted by the legislature) which granted a charter
to establish each specific proposed corporation.52 The charter would
indicate generally what the corporation was to do, the powers it
would have and how it was to be governed.53
The discretionary authority to establish, or not, every corporation
under this system gives the government (whether represented by the
monarch or legislature) significant potential power to control
corporations. The government can refuse to create the corporation
unless convinced there is some good for the economy and society to
come from doing so---indeed, business corporations were relatively
scarce in England, let alone America, under this system.54 The
refusal to grant charters to prospective competitors, especially when
coupled with charters that gave exclusive privileges (monopolies),
meant the government could control the economy by picking
winners and losers (Elizabethan socialism). Unfortunately, the
potential for corruption and entrenching the privileged of society
(crony capitalism) is rife under such a system.55
Since the individual chartering system bespoke of royal
prerogatives and tended to favor those with influence (the
aristocracy), it is not surprising that the French revolutionary
government seems to have pioneered the adoption of a law allowing
anyone to form a corporation by complying with statutory
formalities---in other words, replacing special chartering with what
has come to be known as a general incorporation statute.56 Because
the French experiment was short-lived and forgotten, New York
likes to claim credit for pioneering general incorporation with its
52
E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a
Never-Ending Story?, 86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 483 (2011).
53
J. Hurst, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1780–1970, 15–16 (1970).
54
E.g., Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L.
Rev. 785, 792-94.
55
E.g., Eric Hilt, Early American Corporations and the State, in Lamoreaux & Novak, supra
note 2, at _ (“legislative authority over access to corporate charters was one of the principal
mechanisms by which wealthy and politically connected elites protected their interests”).
56
E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 52 at 483.
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1811 statute, which allowed the formation of manufacturing
corporations by compliance with statutory formalities rather than
obtaining special legislation.57
The New York effort took hold and in the ensuing decades state
after state in the United States,58 as well as other nations,59 adopted
general incorporation statutes. In substantial part, the motive in the
United States remained similar to the French revolutionary law.
Even if dealing with elected state legislatures rather than a
monarchy, the special chartering system was perceived as antidemocratic by favoring the well-connected instead of being equally
available to all.60 Still, the early general incorporation laws in the
United States were often highly restrictive and thus many
individuals desiring to establish corporations went to state
legislatures for special charters.61 Gradually during the course of the
1800s the combined effect of liberalized general incorporation
statutes and the enactment of state constitutional provisions curbing
the legislatures’ power to grant special charters ended the use of
specially chartered corporations instead of formation under the
general incorporation statutes in the United States.62
The irony, of course, is that this effort to democratize
corporations by making them an easily available form for
conducting business meant that corporations proliferated.63 This, in
turn, allowed corporations to become the dominant form for
conducting larger businesses64 and leads us to the subject matter of
this article: The fear that they pose a threat to democracy.
2.

The Success Paradox

The fact that corporations are easy to form does not in itself,
however, account for their popularity---after all partnerships are
even easier to form.65 Instead, several attributes make corporations
an attractive form particularly for conducting larger businesses.

57
See, e.g., Hilt, supra note 55 at _ (explaining that general incorporation for business
corporations started with manufacturing, because this was less controversial than general
incorporation in more politically sensitive fields such as banking); Lawrence M. Friedman, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW _ (2d ed. 1985) (New York’s 1811 law is usually credited as the first
general incorporation statute for business, rather than non-profit, corporations).
58
E.g., Id at 188-98.
59
E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 52 at 484-85.
60
E.g., Hilt, supra note 55 at _; Lamoreaux & Novak, supra note 2, at _ .
61
Id at _.
62
Id at _.
63
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 2-3 (2010) (pointing to data
showing that far more corporations than other forms of businesses, excluding sole proprietorships,
have filed income tax returns in the United States).
64
E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 8 at 1.
65
See, e.g., Holmes v. Lerner, 74 Cal. App. 4th 442, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130 (1999) (partnership
formed without the parties apparently realizing that they had done so).
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The first of these attributes---embodied in the very term
“corporation”---is the concept of a legal person able to own
property, enter contracts and survive the coming and going of
individuals benefitting from and carrying out its activities. This
corporate attribute long predates the business corporation and
reflects the need to use property in various communal activities---be
this the common land or gathering hall used by a town or the
cathedral used by a church. Ownership of the property by the
individual inhabitants of the town or officials of the church creates
an obvious problem as the individuals die or otherwise cease
involvement with the community activity. Hence, medieval
Europeans, picking up terminology and concepts from Roman law,
sought and received charters from their kings creating town, church
and other corporations able to own property.66 The charters for the
early business corporations, such as the East India Company, picked
up this attribute by referring to the company as a body corporate and
empowering the company to own property and the like.67
The earlier discussion of the East India Company already
mentioned its pioneering role in establishing what is referred to as a
joint stock company. Indeed, much of the world refers to what we
in the United States call a corporation as a “stock company” or some
variant thereof.68 This reflects a second attribute of the business
corporation---ownership through freely transferable fungible shares
of stock.
The English East India Company was part of a metamorphosis
from so-called regulated companies---essentially guilds whose
membership consisted of merchants conducting independent
operations under the company’s exclusive government-granted
franchise---into joint stock companies in which voting power and
economic return came from investing in the capital funding the
company’s business (the joint stock) in exchange for fungible shares
in the joint stock (thereby making one a shareholder or
stockholder).69 The Dutch (or United) East India Company--chartered a couple of years after the English company---took this
arrangement a critical step further by making the shares fully
transferable to any buyer.70 The liquidity this provided meant that
investors in the Dutch company did not have to wait literally for
their “ships to come in” to obtain any money. The buying and selling

66

E.g., Blair, supra note 54 at 788-790.
See, e.g., Cawston & Keane, supra note 27 at 87.
68
Franklin A. Gevurtz, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE LAW 4 (2006)
69
E.g., 1 William Robert Scott, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND
IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, 155-58 (1912); M. Schmitthoff, The Origin of the JointStock Company, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 74 (1939).
70
E.g., Dari-Mattiacci supra note 23 at 194.
67
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of freely tradeable stock first by the Dutch and then others led to the
organization of stock markets.71
The third attribute making the corporate form of business
attractive is limited liability for the shareholders---meaning the
shareholders are not personally liable for the company’s debts.
While modern discussions of business form often treat this as the
most important advantage for the corporation over other business
forms,72 limited liability is the most recent attribute to arrive on the
scene---for example, not being part of California’s corporate law
until 1931.73
While these attributes make the corporate form attractive,
especially for operating large, capital intensive businesses, they
create another paradox from the standpoint of corporations and
democracy. The ability of corporations to hold property as the
company’s owners come and go, and to raise capital from large
numbers of investors who retain liquidity by being able to resell their
shares in stock markets and who are not deterred from investing by
fear of personal liability, all combine to make the corporation a
highly efficient vehicle for conducting large scale economic
activities contributing to economic growth.74 Success in these
activities increases the wealth held by the corporation. This success
and accumulation of corporate wealth, however, creates potential
political influence and the fear that wealthy and powerful
corporations can become a threat to democracy.75
Early corporate statutes in the United States reflected this fear by
imposing limits designed to curb corporate wealth and power. Early
general incorporation statutes often set a maximum capital that the
corporation could raise.76 In addition, Nineteenth Century court
opinions held it was beyond the power of a corporation to own stock
in other corporations,77 thereby limiting the growth of the powerful
corporate groups operating in diverse fields that we see today. This
changed after the Civil War. State corporate law limits on corporate
power collapsed as a result of competition between states seeking
71
E.g., Lodewijk Petram, THE WORLD'S FIRST STOCK EXCHANGE: HOW THE AMSTERDAM
MARKET FOR DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY SHARES BECAME A MODERN SECURITIES MARKET,
1602–1700 (Translated from the Dutch by Lynne Richards 2014).
72
E.g., James D. Cox & Thomas L. Hazen, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW 7 (4th ed. 2016) (“A
primary advantage is the shareholders’ limited liability.”)
73
E.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 597-98
(1986).
74
E.g., John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a
Revolutionary Idea xv (2005); Ralph Gomory & Richard Sylla, The American Corporation,
DÆDALUS J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 101, 102 (Spring 2013).
75
E.g., Zingales, supra note 2 at 113.
76
E.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550-554 (1933) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
77
E.g., Alfred D. Chandler Jr., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 323 (1977).
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revenue from in-state incorporation.78 Moreover, many opinion
makers were inclined to see economic concentration as both
inevitable and desirable—a source of economic prosperity, rather
than something to be feared.79
The history of corporations and corporate law also showed that
corporate failure provided as much ground for fear as did corporate
success. Specifically, limited liability means leaving creditors of
failed corporations unpaid.80 More importantly, the Dutch invention
of transferable stock and stock markets has led to a never-ending
boom and bust cycle with economic downturns following stock
market crashes81---as most dramatically illustrated by the Great
Depression following the 1929 crash. All told, we end up with a
“Goldilocks problem”: We seem to want corporations to be
successful, but not too successful.
III.

THE YIN AND YANG OF CORPORATE OR SHAREHOLDER
DEMOCRACY

Another common attribute of corporations is governance under
the ultimate authority of a board of directors elected by the
shareholders.82 While the presence of numerous shareholders with
freely tradable stock creates the need for central management---in
other words, it makes direct management by all of the shareholders
impractical---the notion that this central management should take
the more democratic form of representatives elected by the
shareholders, rather than following a more autocratic structure, is
not inherent. Indeed, there are businesses in which persons invest in
which they do not elect the managers.83 While it is common to refer
to the elected corporate governance structure as corporate or
shareholder democracy,84 the degree to which either the actualities
of this structure or the rationales behind it reflect democratic values
exhibits the dualism running throughout the relationship between
corporations and democracy.
78

Liggett, 288 U.S. at 567-564.
E.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 173, 190-97 (1986).
80
It is debatable, however, whether there would be less negative economic consequences to the
economy if the shareholders had to pay these debts.
81
E.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 403-17 (2006).
82
See note 8 supra.
83
As commonly the case with a limited partnership. See, e.g., Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act, Prefatory
Note (2003) (purpose of the new Uniform Limited Partnership Act is to provide a form of business
for people who want strong central management, strongly entrenched, and passive investors with
little control).
84
E.g., Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of
Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1363 (2006) (referring to “shareholder
democracy”); David L. Ratner, Government of Business Corporations: Critical
Reflections on the Rule of One Share One Vote, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 55 (1970) (referring to
“corporate democracy”).
79
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A. Corporate or Shareholder Democracy as a Shining City on a
Hill
Events in recent years have suggested that the potential threat to
democracy posed by corporate influence may pale in comparison to
a couple of other threats: (1) efforts to game districting and election
mechanics for political advantage (gerrymandering and voter
suppression); and (2) the proliferation of ever more brazen false or
misleading statements from political leaders and their allies.
Corporate law contains rules attacking these sorts of threats when
they involve corporate elections. Such rules, however, are probably
infeasible for non-corporate elections. Hence, corporate or
shareholder democracy starts off with a significant advantage.
1.

Judicial Intervention against Gaming Corporate
Elections

While gerrymandering or otherwise gaming the mechanics of
non-corporate elections is as old as the republic,85 recent events have
focused renewed attention on the dangers such practices pose to
democracy.86
Legal limits in the United States on such conduct are often
indirect. For many years, the most promising line of attack
commonly has been to characterize the districting or other conduct
as racial discrimination violating the Voting Rights Act of 1965.87
The problem with this approach occurs when the racial
discriminatory aspect of the action is incidental to a partisan
purpose. In other words, the Jim Crow laws sought to disenfranchise
African Americans because they were African Americans regardless
of how they would vote.88 By contrast, efforts to suppress the vote
of those likely to support an opposition political party only establish
an issue of racial discrimination insofar as partisan affiliations
correlate with racial identity. But this raises the question of whether
85
E.g., Elmer Griffith, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER (1907) (discussing
gerrymanders early in American history).
86
E.g., Sheldon H. Jacobson, Gerrymandering and restricting voting rights: Flip sides of the
same coin, THE HILL https://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/560995-gerrymandering-and-restrictingvoting-rights-flip-sides-of-the-same-coin (July 1, 2021); David Daley, Inside the Republican Plot for
Permanent Minority Rule, THE NEW REPUBLIC https://newrepublic.com/article/159755/republicanvoter-suppression-2020-election (October 15, 2020).
87
52 U. S. C. §10301. Whether this will change after the Supreme Court’s Brnovich decision
remains to be seen.
88
E.g., Brian K. Landsberg, FREE AT LAST TO VOTE: ALABAMA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 12, 23 (2007); Malia Brink, Fines, Fees, and the Right to Vote,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/votingrights/fines--fees--and-the-right-to-vote/ (February 9, 2020)(“In 1890, Mississippi held a state
constitutional convention. The president of the convention declared its purpose plainly: ‘We came
here to exclude the Negro’….”).

18
motive or effect is to be the test,89 and, if effect is to be the test,90
then how much of an effect is necessary.91
Even beyond claims of racial discrimination, judicial intervention
against gaming non-corporate elections often requires fitting the
challenged conduct into a framework focused on equal rights and
the like for individual voters, which can miss the real issues
presented by electoral tactics designed to frustrate democratic
accountability.92
By contrast, Delaware courts have developed a much more direct
doctrine allowing judicial intervention to prevent incumbents from
gaming the system to gain advantages in corporate elections. This
began with the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Schnell v.
Chris–Craft Industries, Inc.93
Schnell arose out of a contested election for positions on ChrisCraft Industries’ board of directors. The incumbent directors learned
that a dissident group of shareholders intended to solicit their fellow
shareholders to grant proxies---elections of directors for publicly
held corporations normally taking place through voting by
proxies94---for an alternate slate to replace the incumbents at the
next annual shareholders meeting. The incumbents responded by
amending Chris-Craft’s bylaws to advance the date of the annual
meeting by approximately a month. At the same time, the board
stalled giving the dissident group access to the corporation’s list of
shareholders (making it difficult to know whom to solicit for
proxies). The combined impact was to dramatically undercut the
challengers’ chances of unseating the incumbents at the annual
meeting.
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the change in meeting
date should be enjoined. In doing so, the court explained that even
though the corporation’s bylaws and Delaware’s corporation statute
authorized the directors to change the meeting date, courts have the
power to prevent incumbents from using such authority to gain an
inequitable advantage in an election. Schnell thus created a
foundation for judicial intervention against inequitable actions by
incumbents to game corporate election contests.
89
E.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) (holding Voting Rights Act not
violated by discriminatory effect without discriminatory motive).
90
52 U. S. C. §10301(b) (as amended) (overturning Bolden).
91
See, e.g., Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 594 U.S. _ (2021) (substantially
constricting the degree to which racially discriminatory impact establishes a violation of the Voting
Rights Act).
92
E.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004).
93
285 A.2d 437 (Del.1971).
94
See text accompanying note 118 infra.
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Condemning actions in corporate election contests because they
are “inequitable” does not exactly give much guidance for
determining what is condemned. It was the Delaware Chancery
(trial) Court’s decision in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.95
that provided a standard, thus gaining for the lower court naming
rights over the resulting doctrine. Specifically, the court in Blasius
adopted a rule requiring the directors to meet a heavy burden of
demonstrating a compelling justification for any action taken to
interfere with the shareholders’ ability to select the directors.96 The
court held that even the good faith fear of harmful consequences for
the corporation from the action proposed by a shareholder seeking
to have its nominees become a majority of the board97 was not such
a justification. While Blasius was only a decision by the Delaware
Chancery Court, the Delaware Supreme Court subsequently
followed Blasius’ compelling justification test.98
2.

The Ban on False or Misleading Communication in
Corporate Elections

In campaigns involving federal, state, and local elections, charges
and countercharges between candidates, and for and against various
ballot propositions, which, if not outright false, are at least
misleading, have long seemed to be the norm. The remedy for those
in the arena is to respond with denials and perhaps by hurling more
scurrilous charges at one’s opponent in retaliation. A hope has been
that news media could set some boundaries by exposing the worst
lies.99 Unfortunately, studies report mixed results on media fact
checking100 and opinion polls often seemingly support the sad
insight of Goebbels and Orwell that, for many, the big lie, frequently
repeated in simple language, can trump the facts.101
95

564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
The board amended the corporation’s bylaws to increase the board’s size to the maximum
number allowed by the company’s certificate of incorporation and filled the vacancies. This “board
packing” scheme preempted the ability of a dissident shareholder to have the shareholders expand
the board and fill the vacancies with the dissident’s nominees.
97
The plaintiff shareholder proposed a large distribution of money from the corporation to its
shareholders.
98
MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
99
See, e.g., Darrell M. West, How to combat fake news and disinformation,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/ (December 18,
2017) (“It is important for news organizations to call out fake news and disinformation without
legitimizing them.”).
100
E.g., Alexander Agadjanian, et al, Counting the Pinocchios: The Effect of Summary FactChecking Data on Perceived Accuracy and Favorability of Politicians, https://cpb-use1.wpmucdn.com/sites.dartmouth.edu/dist/5/2293/files/2021/03/summary-fact-checking.pdf (last
visited July 2, 2021).
101
E.g., Chris Cillizza, 1 in 3 Americans believe the ‘Big Lie’,
https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/21/politics/biden-voter-fraud-big-lie-monmouth-poll/index.html (June
21, 2021) (discussing opinion polls showing that 32% of those polled believe unfounded claims by
Trump and his allies that Biden’s victory in the 2020 presidential election was the result of massive
fraud).
96
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By contrast, corporate law has long prohibited directors and
others from making false or misleading statements in soliciting votes
from shareholders. This prohibition exists in both state102 and
federal law. The federal prohibition stems from Section 14(a) of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act.103
The Securities Exchange Act is part of the New Deal legislation
and reflects the traditional view that the 1929 stock market crash
triggered the Great Depression. Hence, the Act contains a variety of
provisions designed to increase confidence in the stock market and
prevent abuses which Congress believed led to the crash.104 Section
14(a), however, has a bit of a different focus. It responds to the
concern that the practical powerlessness of shareholders in the
governance of publicly held corporations, in part because of
problems with proxy voting, contributed to poor performance by
large corporations and, therefore, the country’s economic
problems.105 Accordingly, the Section empowers the Securities and
Exchange Commission to adopt regulations governing the
solicitation of proxies to vote shares in publicly traded corporations.
Among the regulations promulgated by the SEC pursuant to
Section 14(a) is Rule 14a–9.106 Rule 14a-9 prohibits proxy
solicitations which contain any false statements as to material facts--in other words, facts a reasonable shareholder would find
important in deciding how to vote.107 It also prohibits proxy
solicitations which omit material facts when the omission makes the
statements in the solicitation misleading or no longer correct.
Solicitations potentially include any communication intended to
lead shareholders to grant or withhold a proxy.108 Violations of Rule
14a-9 trigger a variety of enforcement provisions under the Act.109
In addition, the Supreme Court has held that shareholders have an
implied private right of action against those violating the Rule.110
3.

102

Why these Rules Work in Corporate, but not General,
Elections

E.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del.1977).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a).
104
See, e.g., Id at § 78b (statement of necessity for federal regulation of securities markets).
105
See, e.g., Adolph A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932) (a highly influential work setting out this thesis not long before the enactment of
the Securities Exchange Act).
106
17 CFR § 240.14a-9.
107
E.g., TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
108
E.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.1985).
109
E.g., Securities Exchange Act § 21(d), 15 U.S.C § 78u(d) (empowering the SEC to bring civil
actions to enjoin violation of the Act); § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (criminal liability for those who
willfully violate the Act).
110
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
103
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Tempting as it might be to write an article advocating the import
of these rules from corporate to non-corporate elections, the bottom
line is that this is probably infeasible. For one thing, while Rule 14a9 presumably falls within the doctrine that the First Amendment
does not protect untruthful commercial speech,111 importing a ban
on false or misleading speech into the context of non-corporate
elections is probably unconstitutional because of the much higher
protection accorded to political and public issue speech.112
The fundamental problem with importing these corporate law
rules into the non-corporate election context, however, is not
doctrinal, but practical. Specifically, who will determine whether a
statement is false or misleading, or if a party’s drawing of district
lines or otherwise carrying out election mechanics is inequitable (or
interferes with the voters’ ability to select their government without
compelling justification)?
It is not uncommon for judges to have some partisan leaning,
especially given the process of their selection, and, even if they do
not, judges must be wary of the perception that their actions are
based upon such a leaning.113 Hence, judges understandably tend to
look for clear-cut, objective standards when entering into politically
charged litigation involving contested non-corporate elections.114
Vague standards like inequitably disenfranchise voters, or even
interference with the effectiveness of the vote without compelling
justification, are not such standards.115 Even the determination of
whether a campaign statement is false or misleading often can be
clouded by one’s political views.116

111
See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 556
(1980) (to qualify for First Amendment protection, commercial speech must “concern lawful activity
and not be misleading”). Actually, the characterization of Rule 14a-9 as addressing commercial
speech is debatable. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech
and the First Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 163 (1994). The prohibition in the securities laws of
false or misleading statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities squarely falls
within the regulation of commercial speech, which normally refers to advertising and the like
designed to entice persons into buying goods or services. See Larson v. City and County of San
Francisco, 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1285-1286 (2011). It seems more difficult to characterize the
solicitation of proxies for election to a corporate board as commercial speech, unless one argues that
a key attribute of any investment is the personnel who will manage the investment (the directors in
the case of a corporation) and so regulating of the selection of directors is still regulation of
commercial transactions rather than pure speech.
112
E.g., Staci Lieffring, Note: First Amendment and the Right to Lie: Regulating Knowingly
False Campaign Speech After United States v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047 (2013).
113
See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Book Review: The Supreme Court's Legitimacy Dilemma: Law
and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 (2019) (discussing the tension
between the Court’s desire to maintain legitimacy in the public’s eyes through “sociological
legitimacy” (results do not consistently favor one ideological or political side over the other) and
“legal legitimacy” (results follow a consistently applied legal approach)).
114
E.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2500 (2019) (requiring a “clear, manageable
and politically neutral” test for the Court to interfere in legislative redistricting).
115
See, e.g., id at 2500 (rejecting “fairness” as a test for judicial review of legislative districting).
116
See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Regulating Marijuana Advertising and Marketing to Promote
Public Health: Navigating the Constitutional Minefield, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1081, 1111-12
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This problem is largely absent in corporate law because judges
presumably have less inherent bias in contests among the
shareholders and directors of a particular corporation. In other
words, to adopt these corporate law rules for non-corporate
elections, we might need to have judges who were not themselves
part of the body politic---perhaps aliens from another planet or an
A.I. Put more seriously, the normal separation between judges and
the corporate body politic creates an inherent advantage for the
enforcement of democratic norms in corporate versus non-corporate
elections.
B. The Anti-Democratic Side of Corporate or Shareholder
Democracy
While corporate or shareholder democracy might look good from
a distance, closer examination reveals fundamental flaws.
1.

Technical Failings

Discussions of anti-democratic aspects of corporate or
shareholder democracy often focus on narrow electoral
mechanics.117 A good example involves access to the corporation’s
solicitation of proxies.
As mentioned earlier, shareholder voting in a publicly held
corporation typically will involve the use of proxies. In other words,
shareholders---few of whom normally would wish to spend the
money or time to travel to a shareholder meeting---will grant
authority (a proxy) to vote their stock to someone who will attend.
Commonly, this would be a representative selected by those in
charge of the corporation. Indeed, those in charge of the corporation
typically will have the company solicit the shareholders to grant
such proxies, as otherwise not enough shareholders will be present
to have a quorum.118
This solicitation, paid for by the corporation, will also typically
request that the shareholders grant authority to vote for a list of
nominees for election to the board. A committee of the current board
(“the Court has continued to recognize that commercial speech is different [from other speech] in
that governments have greater ability to determine the truth or falsity of commercial speech”)
117
E.g., Kim, supra note 9 at 336-341(looking at who can call shareholder meetings; what items
shareholders vote on; the ability of shareholders to nominate and remove directors; and the ability of
shareholders to bring actions for breach of fiduciary duty); Bebchuk, supra note 9 at 696-706
(recommending reforms to provide proxy access, reimbursement of challenger expenses, majority
rather than plurality vote to elect directors; and confidential voting).
118
E.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 103
(1976).
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typically selects these nominees and thus, not surprisingly, these
nominees are mostly the current incumbents.119 Those wishing to
run against the board’s nominees normally must solicit proxies on
their own dime.120 Indeed, the form to grant a proxy in the
solicitation paid for by the corporation looks a lot like the ballot in
old Soviet Union, which listed only the Communist Party’s
candidate for any given office and provided only the “choice” of
voting yes (da) or no (nyet) on the Party’s nominee.121
In recent years, there have been efforts to change this system so
that the names of competing candidates for election to the board
appear on the form for granting a proxy distributed by the
corporation and to require the person exercising the proxy to vote
shares for whichever candidates the shareholders instruct. This is
referred to as proxy access.122 At the urging of institutional and
activist shareholders, many public companies have adopted bylaws
providing for proxy access.123 Yet, many of the common limits in
these proxy access bylaws, such as preventing the use of proxy
access to run a slate of candidates for more than a small fraction of
the board,124 seem to have little basis in democratic norms.
Beyond these private efforts, a provision in the Dodd-Frank Act
specifically authorizes the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule.125
Ironically, in Business Roundtable v. SEC,126 the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals struck down the rule the SEC came up with based upon
flaws the court found with the SEC’s assessment of the rule’s costs
versus benefits---an anti-democratic bit of judicial activism which
effectively ignored the Congressional mandate.127
Anti-democratic election mechanics, such as limited proxy
access, can be highly significant in undercutting corporate or
shareholder democracy. Indeed, the financial advantage of
incumbents in soliciting proxies at corporate expense, while
119
E.g., Id at 112. While stock exchange rules require the board to have a nominating committee
consisting of so-called independent directors (N.Y.S.E. Rule 303A), there is no evidence this has led
to a substantial change in the practice of renominating incumbents.
120
See note 128 infra.
121
See, e.g., Rule 14a-4, 17 CFR § 240.14a-4 (the form for granting a proxy must provide a
means for the shareholder to indicate whether the shareholder is granting or withholding authority to
vote for each director for whom the party soliciting the proxy wishes to vote).
122
E.g., Holly J. Gregory, et. al, The Latest on Proxy Access, HARV. L.S. FOR. CORP. GOV.,
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu (February 1, 2019).
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
126
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challengers must (at least unless they win128) foot the expenses for
soliciting their own proxies, explains in part why corporate elections
are rarely contested.129 The lack of contested corporate elections, in
turn, means that, as a practical matter, a self-perpetuating oligarchy
ends up in control over most of the largest corporations.130 Yet, the
anti-democratic mechanics for carrying out corporate elections
might be small potatoes---because it would not require radical
change to fix131---next to the fundamentally anti-democratic nature
of shareholder democracy itself.
2.

The Anti-Democratic Pay-to-Play Essence of
“Shareholder Democracy”

In fact, the most anti-democratic feature of corporate or
shareholder democracy is the shareholder part. To see why, it might
be helpful to briefly ask what we mean when we say something is
democratic or undemocratic.
a.

What Is Democratic?

Determination of what is democratic or anti-democratic or what
are democratic values and norms can become quite complicated and
contentious. At its most basic, democracy means rule by the
people.132 This, however, begs as many questions as it answers. To
begin with, in any sizeable group, having the overall populace make
the governing decisions is largely impractical. Hence, democracy
commonly becomes equated with a republican system in which the
overall populace elects those who are in charge.133
This, in turn, leads to a focus on the laws establishing, and the
implementation of, procedures for elected government. One simple
definition along this line is that a democracy exists if there have been
two changes of the government through free and fair elections and
128
Since courts will not order a corporation to reimburse a shareholder’s proxy solicitation
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A.D.2d 646, 276 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1966)) the challengers must normally win control over the board to
get the directors to vote to pay their expenses. Even then, however, courts might hold that the
corporation cannot reimburse the expenses. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane
Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955) (suggesting that the corporation cannot reimburse
expenses unless the contest involved a policy dispute).
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even on their own dime. For a discussion and a proposal to import into corporate law the Buckley
doctrine barring caps on political expenditures, see Andrew A. Schwartz, Financing Corporate
Elections, 41 J. CORP. L. 863 (2016).
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there is no realistic threat to democracy from an authoritarian
government.134 Much seems missing in such a definition. For
instance, are elections free and fair if those in power control the
media and harass efforts by opponents to organize opposition
parties? This leads to lists, such as the often-cited lists put together
by Robert Dahl: universal suffrage; elected representatives; free,
fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative
sources of independent information; associational autonomy; and
inclusive citizenship.135
Some social scientists think the focus on elections (the formal
procedures of democracy) too narrow. Presumably going back to the
elemental notion that democracy is rule by the people, Charles Tilly
suggests defining democracy as “conformity of a state’s behavior to
it citizens’ express demands” ---which he measures as the degree
that relations between the citizens and the state feature “broad,
equal, protected136 and mutually binding consultation.”137
For present purposes it is unnecessary to choose between these
approaches. Instead, it is sufficient to draw out a pair of core
democratic values common to them.
The first goes to who is entitled to vote in elections (in the
narrower formulation) or participate in the political process as a
citizen (in the broader formulation). Both equate democracy with the
breadth of those holding political rights: Dahl’s list begins with
universal suffrage, while Tilly’s first factor is the breadth of the
adults enjoying citizenship rights. Of course, many nations that are
the forebearers of democracy (including our own) fell far short of
universal suffrage and, indeed, not that long ago many influential
voices would have contested the equation of democracy with
universal suffrage.138 Still, since human institutions are inherently
imperfect, democracy is commonly a matter of more versus less
rather than it is or is not.139 Seen in this light, a wider franchise is
more democratic while a narrower franchise is less democratic.140
Hence, the history of an expanding right to vote in the United States
has been a move from lesser toward greater democracy.141
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Overlapping with the notion of a broadly held ability to
participate as a citizen (vote) is the notion of equality in electoral
power among the citizens (voters). This is Tilly’s second criteria,
while Dahl addresses a book to the topic.142 For those preferring
judicial authority, the Supreme Court recognized this democratic
value in its one-person, one-vote decisions: “The concept of ‘we the
people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters
but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications.”143
Actually, the breadth and equality values are two sides of the same
core difference between democracy and other forms of government:
Democracy rejects the notion behind all other forms of government
that some individuals have a greater claim to decision making power
than others (except, of course, insofar as that decision making power
traces to democratic election).
b.

Why Shareholder “Democracy” Is Not

Looking at these two central democratic values, shareholder
democracy misses the mark by a wide margin.144 The principal
features of shareholder democracy are that the franchise is limited
to the shareholders and that voting power is based upon how many
shares one owns rather than one-person, one-vote.145 Both the
limited franchise and the unequal voting power among shareholders,
in turn, are symptomatic of a more fundamental departure of
shareholder democracy from democracy. Essentially, shareholder
democracy operates under a vote buying system: Persons buy into
the franchise by purchasing shares and gain greater voting rights by
purchasing more shares.146
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Dahl, supra note 139.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368). But
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We can demonstrate how this is the essence of shareholder voting
by asking why employees do not get a vote. It is not because
employees lack a significant stake in the decisions made by those
governing the corporation: The impact of such decisions on
employees is commonly greater than the impact on the typical public
shareholder.147 It is not because employees do not contribute to the
corporation: The corporation would not make money without them.
Instead, it is because employees did not buy stock. In fact, if
employees buy stock, they will get a vote.148
Corporate finance theory also supports the notion that the
shareholder franchise is essentially a vote buying system. This is a
corollary of the Modigliani and Miller dividend irrelevance theory.
This theory holds that, putting aside potential impact on taxes and
the like, corporate shareholders benefit equally from dividends or
from the rise in the price of their stock as the corporation reinvests
its earnings.149 The deeper implication of this theory is that the
economic rights of stock ownership can just as well constitute
simply a theoretical claim to a share of corporate earnings that a
shareholder never needs to actually receive but can benefit from by
someone else purchasing this theoretical claim to earnings, that this
person will also never actually receive except by someone else
purchasing this claim and on and on. In other words, shareholders
can simply have pieces of paper (or a digital equivalent) that says
this percentage of a wealth producing enterprise represents their
shares, but they never actually need to see any distribution of the
wealth produced by the enterprise. Under these circumstances, the
only practical right of share ownership becomes the vote.
Yet, the notion that prospective voters should buy their votes is
contrary to fundamental democratic values. As the Supreme Court
recognized in striking down poll taxes, “wealth or fee paying has . .
. no relation to voting qualifications.”150 In fact, shareholder
democracy is worse than a poll tax, since the ability to buy more
votes by purchasing more shares is the equivalent of having a poll
tax in which voting power is proportionate to the amount of tax one
is willing and able to pay.
147
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Indeed, there is a certain irony here insofar as a number of state
corporate laws traditionally have prohibited so-called “vote buying”
---in other words, paying shareholders to vote in an agreed way---in
corporate elections.151 This seemingly mirrors (albeit without the
criminal law consequences) the pretty universal rule in general
elections in which it is illegal to pay voters to vote in a certain
way.152
A seeming reconciliation of the vote buying ban in corporate law
with the fact that people always buy votes in corporate elections by
buying stock invokes concerns about the motivation for buying the
right to vote without buying the stock impacted by how one votes.153
This rationalization rings rather hollow, however, when one realizes
that there are all sorts of arrangements under which persons can gain
the right to vote stock and yet are insulated from the consequences
to the corporation from their votes---what is sometimes referred to
as “empty voting”.154 Moreover, it is not uncommon for
corporations to have more than one class (type) of stock in which
some classes might lack voting rights, or some classes might possess
more than one vote per share---arrangements which are hardly
consistent with the rationale that voting power should be
proportionate to economic consequences.155
C. Dualism in Thinking about Corporate or Shareholder
Democracy
The dualism in whether corporate or shareholder democracy is
democratic parallels a dualism in the rationales advanced for having
corporate or shareholder democracy. Specifically, is corporate
governance simply about utilitarian economic outcomes or is a goal
to provide democratic legitimacy for those with the power to govern
large corporations?
1.

Economics
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The departure of shareholder democracy from core democratic
values in large part mirrors a dominant strain in thinking about
corporate governance. This views the topic through an
instrumentalist lens concerned with economic outcomes rather than
what is democratic. Interestingly, this is a common approach both
for those rationalizing and promoting shareholder democracy and
for those critical of it.
a.

The Economic Efficiency Argument for
Shareholder Democracy

Large corporations, like other large organizations, involve joint
activities organized in pyramidal hierarchies. Economists
sometimes explain this as based upon avoiding the transaction costs
that would otherwise exist if each and every good or service
necessary to produce another good or service came from
independent individuals constantly contracting with each other to
supply each and every such good or service.156 The question then
becomes who should stand at the pinnacle of the hierarchy. The
economic efficiency argument is that this should be the person(s)
with the best incentives. Those favoring shareholder democracy on
such utilitarian reasoning assert that this is the shareholders.
This argument views shareholders as the so-called residual
claimants in the corporation---in other words, they get what is left
over after everyone else (employees, suppliers, lenders) gets paid.157
Since the shareholders stand last in line to obtain assets from the
corporation, the first dollar of corporate loss comes out of their
pockets. Since the shareholders get everything made by the
corporation after paying the other claimants, the last dollar of profit
goes into their pockets. Hence, the argument runs, the shareholders’
interest matches the wealth maximizing or efficient result for the
whole venture: investing until the next possible dollar of gain
multiplied by the probability of obtaining it is less than the next
possible dollar of loss multiplied by the probability of incurring it.158
While, under this view, the shareholders have the best incentives
when making overall corporate decisions and monitoring the
156
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supervisors at the top of the hierarchy carrying out such decisions,
in a publicly held corporation the shareholders are too numerous and
rationally disengaged to do this themselves.159 Therefore, the
reasoning continues, shareholders should elect those (the board of
directors) with the ultimate authority to make overall decisions and
to monitor and replace, if necessary, the senior supervisors carrying
out these decisions. In this manner, the board will be responsive to
the interests of the shareholders and pursue the most wealth
maximizing actions for the corporation.160
Indeed, under this sort of thinking it is even possible to applaud
the whole vote buying idea of shareholder democracy. After all, if
shareholders are too numerous and rationally disengaged to make
overall decisions for, and carefully monitor what is going on at, their
corporations, they are also normally too numerous and rationally
disengaged to organize opposition seeking to oust underperforming
directors and managers. It is easier to follow the so-called “Wall
Street rule” of selling your shares if you do not like the
management161---something that is much less practical for a citizen
dissatisfied with his or her government and that further accounts for
few corporate elections being contested. On the other hand, this
creates the opportunity for those who think they can better manage
the corporation to buy enough stock to gain control. Hence, vote
buying through the purchase of stock can lead to greater efficiency
by replacing poor management with better.162
b.

Second Thoughts about Shareholder Interests

There has been considerable pushback against the view that
giving primacy to shareholder interests, at least as shareholders
often perceive their interests, produces the economically optimal
decisions for corporations or for society more broadly.
A common example involves the incentives for shareholders
when a corporation is at or near insolvency.163 If a corporation’s
assets are less than, or even barely in excess of, its debts, then losing
159
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expenditures by the informed shareholder, as well as by the other shareholders to evaluate the
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further money essentially only harms the creditors and not the
shareholders. On the other hand, any earnings in excess of the debts
will go to the shareholders. Under this circumstance, high risk
investments (like bets at a roulette wheel) make sense from the
shareholders’ standpoint. This will be true even though such
investments have a net negative value (in that the magnitude of the
possible loss from the investment, multiplied by the probability of
the loss, exceeds the magnitude of the possible gain from the
investment, multiplied by the probability of the gain) and so the
investments are inefficient from an overall economic standpoint.
Examples of poor incentives for shareholders are not confined to
nearly insolvent corporations. Many of these examples involve socalled “short-termism”164 or other myopic decisions that might have
an immediately favorable impact on the shareholders of a
corporation but can have negative consequences when viewed over
a longer-term or broader economic perspective. For example, tales
of layoffs and moving plants in search of lower labor costs can
discourage employees at all corporations from investing in
developing firm-specific human capital (in other words, developing
skills which are not completely transferable to another company).
This can result in lower corporate efficiency across the economy
even though the layoffs and plant moving increased the immediate
wealth for the shareholders of the corporation that did it.165
More broadly, actions that favor the interests of shareholders over
others impacted by corporate activities might not be optimal when
viewed from a larger economic or social standpoint. Specifically,
maximizing corporate profits for the benefit of shareholders would
normally appear to call for lowering costs---including compensation
and benefits for employees.166 It also normally calls for increasing
revenues, including by increasing prices charged to consumers.167 In
addition, it would call for taking advantage of externalities, say by
lowering expenditures on safety or pollution control unless required
by the government.168 Such actions can have negative consequences
in terms of income inequality and sustainability that outweigh the
gains to the shareholders when looked at in terms of broader
economic and societal consequences.
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Not surprisingly, many expressing concern about the negative
economic or other consequences of giving primacy to shareholder
interests are then led to express hostility to shareholder
democracy169---including by opposing reforms such as proxy
access.170 Interestingly, however, few such commentators appear to
express opposition to democratic government in general.
2.

Legitimacy

While this might be an unfair comparison, both sides of the
economic-oriented narrative regarding corporate or shareholder
democracy can remind one a bit of the apologists for Mussolini, who
said that he “made the trains run on time.” Democracy does not
necessarily find its justification in utilitarian economic
considerations. Admittedly, one could say that business is all about
economics. Yet, there is a democracy for its own sake thread in
corporate governance thinking.
a.

The Original Purpose for Elected Corporate
Boards

Indeed, this corporate democracy for its own sake notion is far
older than the focus on economic outcomes. As mentioned earlier,171
the joint-stock companies, like the East India Company, which are
the forebears of the modern corporation, evolved out of so-called
regulated companies. The regulated companies were little more than
merchant guilds whose members had the exclusive right to conduct
trade between England and areas such as the Baltic (for the Eastland
Company) or Turkey (for the Levant Company).172 The members of
the regulated companies typically elected boards of those who we
would now refer to as directors.173 As the regulated companies
evolved into the earliest joint stock companies, this model of an
elected board went along for the ride---either as what started out as
a regulated company turned into a joint stock company or as the
early joint stock companies modeled the governance provisions in
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their charters on the governance provisions of the regulated
companies.174
The regulated companies themselves, being essentially guilds,
took the elected board governance model commonly used by
guilds,175 which over time had replaced direct governance by all of
the guild’s members with decision making by elected
representatives.176 Moreover, given the close connection between
the economic role and populace of medieval European towns and
the merchants, the merchant guilds were closely connected with
medieval European municipal governments.177 Hence, the parallel
between the guild boards and the town councils, which developed
after medieval towns became too large for meetings of the entire
townsfolk.178 Moreover, to medieval European jurists, both guilds
and towns were a universitates (essentially, a corporation) and, as
such, were subject to common norms of governance with other
corporations.179 These included political ideas and practices also
manifested in medieval European parliaments and in Church
councils.180
Among these political ideas and practices was the medieval
European preference for expressions of consensus when making
decisions impacting all members of the community.181 One
manifestation of this preference occurred when Canon Law jurists
turned a Roman Law doctrine of quod omnes tangit ab omnibus
approbetur (“what touches all is to be approved by all”) from a
technical rule involving co-tutorship into a broad principle of
governance.182 This principle applied not only to the Church, but to
other “corporations”---using the term in the broader sense of a
collective group, including guilds and towns183---and was invoked
in the summonses sent by kings demanding that representatives
appear at a parliament.184 The role, then, of a board, council, or
parliament was to have representatives with full power (plena
174
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potestas) grant the consent required on behalf of the broader
community.185
Indeed, it is fairly easy to see that consent of the governed, rather
than economic efficiency, represented the original purpose for
boards when we ask what exactly the board of a regulated company
or guild did. These boards obviously did not manage a business or
supervise those who did on behalf of passive investors. Rather, in
addition to adjudicating disputes involving the merchants, these
boards adopted ordinances to regulate the membership.186 For
example, the board of the Eastland Company adopted a regulation
prohibiting members from “colouring” goods---in other words,
selling the goods of a nonmember merchant as a member’s own--thereby circumventing the company’s monopoly.187 Hence, these
boards reflected the essentially democratic notion that the members
of a group should elect those who make decisions and rules
governing the members of the group.
b.

Contemporary Expressions

Even if elected board governance of corporations originated in
democratic notions of consent of the governed, one might ask what
this has to do with governance of the modern business corporation.
In fact, the notion of legitimacy through a democratically elected
government remains a thread in corporate governance thinking. One
of the best articulations of this sort of thinking is found in the Blasius
opinion discussed earlier.188
The directors in Blasius argued that the court should apply the
deferential business judgment rule189 to their efforts blocking the
plaintiff shareholder from obtaining majority control of the board.
In rejecting this argument, Chancellor Allen (who had a substantial
influence on Delaware corporate law despite not serving on the
state’s Supreme Court) explained:
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The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests. . . .
It has, for a long time, been conventional to dismiss the
stockholder vote as a vestige or ritual of little practical
importance. . . . Be that as it may, however, whether the vote
is seen functionally as an unimportant formalism, or as an
important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is critical to the
theory that legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors
and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do not
own.190
Indeed, one wonders whether state legislatures would have
enacted laws allowing for general incorporation, particularly at a
time in which such laws reflected a fear of corporate power, without
the patina of democratic legitimacy provided by governance under
an elected board.
IV.

CORPORATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF
SOCIETY AS A WHOLE

A. Situating the Private Association within the Democratic
Governance of Society
1.

The Impact of Corporations on Individuals in Society

Many who express support for democracy in general nevertheless
might not much care about whether corporate governance adheres
to democratic values.191 Such a view explicitly or implicitly draws a
distinction between political entities (e.g., nations, states or
provinces, cities) and private associations such as corporations.
Under this view, how private associations choose to govern
themselves is primarily a matter of private contracting and does not
impact the question of whether the governance of society is
democratic. In other words, this view rejects any linkage between
the internal and external aspects of corporations and democracy.
This view, however, overlooks the normal operation of human
societies. Human societies rarely exist as simply atomistic
individuals living within political entities. Instead, societies consist
of various associations among individuals.192 In addition to families,
190
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this includes associations for both non-economic (such as religious)
and economic purposes (including business corporations). The
decisions of those governing such associations can have as much or
more impact on the lives of individuals as the decisions of those in
charge of political entities.
This is certainly the case with large corporations. The largest
firms, almost all of whom are corporations,193 produce most goods
and services in the United States.194 They employ the majority of the
private sector workers.195 They pollute the environment196 and cause
innumerable injuries.197 Their failure can bring down the
economy.198
2.

Democratic Consent or Accountability for Those
Governing Corporations

The fact that various associations, such as corporations, impact
the lives of individuals does not mean they undermine the
democratic governance of society unless they have an internal
governance adhering to democratic norms. Families commonly do
not govern themselves under such norms. Here is where one must
consider the interaction of the internal and the external. What makes
the impact and governance of private associations consistent with a
democratic society is either (1) their internal governance under
democratic norms; (2) the ability of individuals to disassociate from
such associations and from the impact of the decisions of those in
charge of such associations; or (3) the prospect for intervention by
democratically elected governments of political entities when
disassociation is an inadequate remedy.
193
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In other words, the internal governance of corporations is simply
one means for potentially giving democratic voice to those impacted
by the decisions of corporate management. If internal governance
gives such a democratic voice, then corporations serve as part of the
democratic governance of society, rather than constituting a threat
to it. To look to subnational political entities by analogy, this is why
it is rare to hear assertions that the State of California, because of its
wealth and power, constitutes a threat to democracy in the United
States. After all, the government of the State of California is
democratically elected. So long as the democratically elected
officials do not take actions to undermine continued democratic
accountability, the mere fact that the state is wealthy and powerful
does not make it a threat to democracy.199 On the other hand, to the
extent that the internal governance of corporations does not provide
democratic voice to those impacted by the corporation, then one
must look to the external means of democratic consent or
accountability.
Those inclined toward a laissez faire ideology focus on the ability
of individuals to either accept or avoid the impact of dealing with a
corporation by the choice to either contract or refrain from
contracting with it.200 Put in terms of democratic rather than
economic values, individual choice through contracting or refusing
to do so provides the consent of, and accountability to, the
individuals potentially impacted by the decisions of those in charge
of corporations. Thus, it achieves the underlying democratic goal of
consent by or accountability to the governed.
The problem is that voluntary association and disassociation
often might not provide consent and accountability. An obvious
example is those harmed by corporate activities to which they did
not agree, such as tort victims or the victims of environmental
degradation caused by the corporation’s activities. In many other
instances, market failures, such as limited realistic options in
concentrated markets (for instance, those in which network effects
create dominant positions for some companies),201 other situations
involving unequal bargaining power,202 or inaccurate or insufficient
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Indeed, if the mere wealth and power of a political entity makes it a threat to democracy
despite having a democratic government, then the United States itself is a threat to democracy.
200
E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 22-25 (1996); Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 156 at 777.
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E.g., Zingales, supra note 2 at 120-121.
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information available to individuals dealing with corporations,203
can render choice illusory.
In these situations, the availability of intervention by the
democratically elected government of a political entity---whether
this is through tort liability, safety and environmental regulations,
antitrust enforcement, labor laws, or anti-fraud and mandatory
disclosure laws---restores democratic accountability. Hence, even
Milton Friedman’s famous essay,204 which argued that the job of
corporate managers is solely to make money for the shareholders,
added the qualifier “while conforming to the basic rules of the
society [including] those embodied in law.”205
Needless to say, the appropriate line between government
intervention and leaving protections to private contracting is a
subject on which there long has been debate.206 From the standpoint
of democratic values, however, the key is not whether Milton
Friedman or Paul Krugman is right on where this line should fall.
Rather, it is that democratically elected governments, acting in
accordance with democratic principles, make the decision.
Here again, the internal meets the external in the relationship
between corporations and democracy. The persons in charge of
corporations not only make decisions affecting individuals impacted
by corporate activities, but they also make decisions about
deploying corporate resources to influence the government. This
means that the non-democratic aspects of internal corporate
governance not only cut off democratic consent or accountability
through such internal governance for the corporation’s activities, but
they also cut off such consent or accountability for the corporation’s
efforts to influence government. Moreover, if such efforts are
successful, then the prospect of government intervention also might
fail to restore democratic consent and accountability. This brings us
to Citizens United and corporate speech.
B. The Debate about Corporate Speech
Much of the current concern about the anti-democratic influence
of corporations focuses on corporate rights to free speech and the
203
Id at 1201 (“Corporations can also manipulate the design of their products or engage in
misleading advertising campaigns, distorting consumers’ risk perceptions or their evaluation of other
product attributes.”); Hansona1 & Kysara, supra note 197 (discussing techniques companies
successfully use to exploit consumer irrationality).
204
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its Profit, N.Y.T. SUN.
MAG. 32 (Sept. 13, 1970).
205
Id at 33.
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U. CHI. L. REV. 1463 (1996).
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Citizens United decision.207 In this decision, the Supreme Court
struck down the federal ban on corporations making independent
expenditures for “electioneering communication.” In a nutshell, the
court held that Congress could not bar political speech simply
because it came from a corporation.208 The result is to seemingly cut
off the instinctive approach of many of those worried about
excessive corporate influence on democratically elected
governments, which is to bar corporations from at least some
political activities open to individuals.
This, in turn, raises the question of whether the law can treat
corporate political speech differently from speech by individuals.
When all is said and done, there are essentially three arguments for
doing so: one doctrinal, one results-oriented policy, and one
consistent with democratic values.
1.

The Corporate “Person” Distraction

A baseline doctrinal argument challenges whether corporations
are “persons” subject to the same protections under the First
Amendment as individuals.209 Specifically, corporations come into
existence by act of government, not God, even if now carried out
through easy compliance with general incorporation statutes. Hence,
the argument runs, rather than being “endowed by their creator with
certain unalienable rights,” corporations only possess those rights
that the government finds it useful to give. This is known as the
concession theory.210 Under a simple-minded version of this theory,
the government can restrict free speech by corporations however
much it wants.211 While there are counter-theories and back and
forth,212 the problem with taking this argument to its logical extreme
is that depriving corporations of the ability to assert free speech
claims would severely endanger democracy.
After all, it was the New York Times Company which, in New
York Times v. Sullivan,213 claimed protection under the First
207
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Amendment when the Montgomery Alabama Police Commissioner
sued it for defamatory statements contained in an advertisement
published in the Times by supporters of Martin Luther King, Jr. The
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment applied and a public
official suing for defamation cannot recover unless he or she shows
that the defendant knew the statement was false. The Court does not
even discuss the fact that the New York Times Company is a
corporation. Limiting the ability of government officials to stifle
criticism by suing for defamation would seem to enhance
democracy. Excluding corporations from asserting this First
Amendment protection would leave out most publishers and news
organizations.214
Another Supreme Court decision involving the New York Times
Company, as well as the Washington Post Company (also a
corporation), is New York Times Company v. United States.215 In this
decision, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s request for
an injunction blocking the two papers’ publication of the secret
“Pentagon Papers”---a report prepared for the Department of
Defense which documented the duplicitous history of public
assurances by the United States’ government regarding the war in
Vietnam. Once again, the defendants’ status as corporations merited
no attention in extending free speech protection. Indeed, denying
corporations the right to challenge a prior restraint on speech would
allow the government to block disclosure it finds uncomfortable
from the organs most likely to distribute such information to the
public.
Of course, one might distinguish protections of speech from
protections of “the press” or draw other distinctions based upon the
nature of the corporation or the nature of the speech.216 This,
however, renders broad discussion of the nature of corporate
personhood and the First Amendment into something of a red
herring. Once the law crosses the Rubicon of extending to some
corporations, or corporations in some contexts, free speech rights,
there needs to be a principled basis for saying when corporations
214
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will not enjoy such rights. Focusing on corporate “personhood”
hardly seems to provide this lodestar. Nor is it necessary, since free
speech cases draw all sorts of contextual distinctions in deciding
when the government has infringed the free speech rights of
individuals (who are clearly persons).217
2.

The Corporate Wealth Argument

The common policy-oriented argument for limiting corporate
political speech is that the excessive influence over politicians and
government decisions that wealthy corporations can obtain through
political expenditures and corporate speech creates a danger to
democratic governance responsive to the interests of all Americans
rather than the private greed of corporations.218 This argument
commonly features eye-popping figures on the wealth of large
corporations, as well as the amount of their expenditures on political
speech, and discussions of the influence of such speech in advancing
an agenda hostile to workers, consumers, the environment and so
on.219 Sometimes, this is accompanied by a conspiratorial vision
regarding the broader tenacles of those advancing an aggressively
pro-business and anti-regulatory agenda through increasingly
conservative courts and the like.220
Unfortunately, this line of argument often smacks of
“corporations should not enjoy free speech when I do not like what
they have to say.” Indeed, those who worry about corporate
advocacy against regulations addressing worker pay and safety, the
environment, or consumer protection, are not often heard expressing
qualms about corporations flexing their wealth in order to promote
racial equality or punish the intolerant among us.221
217
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In any event, the fundamental problem with the corporate wealth
argument is that it fails to distinguish corporations from others who
also derive political power from wealth (e.g., billionaires). Actually,
the bulk of corporations are not that large.222 On the flip side, there
is much writing on the political influence of the so-called donor class
of billionaires and other wealthy individuals and families.223 While
the very largest corporations have more wealth than the richest
individuals,224 it is not clear how much this really matters. In other
words, the wealthiest individuals have more than enough money to
influence politics.225 Moreover, wealthy individuals are commonly
such because they are shareholders in wealthy corporations.226
Hence, limiting political expenditures by corporations, but not
wealthy shareholders, might simply result in the same money
coming from a different bank account.
Beyond this, the corporate wealth argument creates serious
difficulty when it comes to media corporations. As discussed above
when dealing the two New York Times decisions, speech by news
media corporations may be critical to maintaining a democracy. Yet,
“the press” might also include such dominant corporations as
Facebook and Google.227 In addition, even the most conventional
news outlets are often part of larger corporate groups whose political
agendas could reach far beyond broadcasting the news.228 Finally,
recent years have shown that corporate influence can be as powerful
and potentially threatening to democracy when it simply consists of
broadcasting supposedly “fair and balanced” news as it can be when
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consisting of overt political expenditures by a corporation that
makes no claim to be part of the press.229
Ultimately, defending Citizen United’s rejection of the corporate
wealth argument is not to discount the concern about money in
politics. Indeed, perhaps where the Court has gone wrong lies in an
all-to-casual equation of spending money with any other form of
speech in which more is better.230 Ignored is the concern that
allowing those with greater wealth to have greater political influence
seems contrary to the democratic value of equality among voters.
Nevertheless, this concern is not limited to corporate speech.
3.

Who Decides What a Corporation Says?

The one thing regarding speech that is undeniably different
between a corporation and an individual is that a corporation cannot
actually decide what it is going to say; instead, those in charge of
the company make that decision. This returns us to the interplay of
the internal and the external with respect to the relationship between
corporations and democracy. Specifically, the undemocratic nature
of corporate governance means a lack of democratic consent or
accountability not only for decisions regarding corporate conduct,
but also for decisions about employing corporate resources to lobby
against government intervention that would restore democratic
accountability.231
a.

Speech Advancing Idiosyncratic Views of those in
Charge

The ability of those in charge of a corporation to dictate the
company’s political speech creates potential issues in two basic
contexts: one being rather trivial, the other presenting a fundamental
issue regarding democracy. The former involves corporate speech
in favor of what, for want of better terminology, we can label the
idiosyncratic views of those in charge of the corporation.
Idiosyncratic in this context does not mean that the views are not
widely held. Rather, this term is intended to capture the essential
notion that the views are not particularly relevant to the corporate
enterprise.232
229
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This is the type of speech addressed in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti.233 In this decision, the Supreme Court struck
down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited banks and business
corporations from spending money to influence referenda other than
those that affected the property or business of the corporation. This
statute seemed to be an obvious effort to force management of a
business corporation to stick to business when it came to political
expenditures.
In fact, the issues raised in this context are rather minor in the
greater scheme of corporations and democracy. For one thing, it is
not necessary to address the failings in corporate or shareholder
democracy in order to address these issues. Even if one assumes that
corporate or shareholder democracy perfectly matches democratic
values and practices, there are still likely to be minority shareholders
who might object to a particular idiosyncratic political position
being advanced at corporate expense. The question is whether states
have the power to protect such minority shareholders from having
their corporation’s assets used to subsidize such views.
Since one of the traditional functions of state corporate law has
been to protect minority shareholders from having the corporation’s
assets used by those in charge, even when supported by the majority
of shareholders, for purposes beyond that for which the minority
shareholders signed up (conducting lawful business),234 an
affirmative answer to this question should be easy.235 The Court
nevertheless held that the particular statute before the Court in
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Bellotti infringed on the First Amendment because it was over- and
under-inclusive relative to this goal.236
In any event, the practical impact of corporate speech which falls
into this context is relatively small. Because the positions taken by
the corporation in this context, by definition, flow from the views of
whoever happens to be in charge, these positions will exhibit a
certain randomness.237 This, in turn, suggests less grounds for worry
about undue corporate influence over government. So, for example,
positions urged by corporations with more socially progressive
management will offset positions urged by corporations with more
socially conservative management and so the impact is simply more
speech rather than pushing governmental action in a single direction.
While one might object to the ability of some individuals to gain
greater influence by using the money of other people who might not
subscribe to their views, this does not appear to present a significant
structural threat to governance of the overall society in accordance
with democratic values.238
b.

Speech Advancing the Interests of those
Structurally in Charge of Corporations over the
Interests of those not

The context in which corporate speech potentially implicates the
overall democratic governance of society is where the speech favors
the interests of those groups structurally in charge of corporations
(management and majority shareholders) at the expense of those
with less or no voice through corporate or shareholder democracy
but who nevertheless are impacted by the corporation and contribute
236
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toward its wealth. In other words, the problem flows from
interaction of the internal (the failure of corporate or shareholder
democracy to reflect democratic values) with the external (corporate
speech seeking to block democratic governments of political entities
from protecting the interests of those lacking voice through
corporate or shareholder democracy).
In fact, there are several overlapping threads to this concern, hints
of which are buried in the muddled distortion argument in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.239 In Austin, the Court upheld a
Michigan prohibition of corporations making independent
expenditures in support of or opposition to candidates for office---a
result the Court overruled in Citizens United. In upholding this
statute, the Court in Austin pointed to the “distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help
of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 240
At first glance, this seems to be just a gussied-up form of the
corporate wealth argument. Specifically, corporations, or indeed
anyone with greater wealth,241 might use their wealth to obtain
influence that has no correlation to the public support for the ideas
being advanced---in contrast with small dollar donations to political
causes in which the amount of money available is roughly
proportionate to the number of individuals who support the cause.
Yet, this understates the matter.
It is not simply that the wealth available does not correlate with
public support of the cause advanced by those in charge of the
corporation in this context. Rather, the problem is that the amount
of corporate money available to seek political influence in this
context is likely to be inversely proportionate to the support of the
corporation’s cause from those who are contributing to the
corporation’s wealth but lack a say in its governance.
Keep in mind that this context involves lobbying for policies that
favor those in charge of the corporation over others---such as
employees, consumers, involuntary victims of the corporation’s
activities---who also contributed to the corporation’s wealth. Hence,
the larger number of individuals from whom those in charge of the
corporation can extract corporate wealth, the more wealth they have
239
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available to lobby against government efforts to intervene on behalf
of such individuals. Moreover, the more successful such lobbying is
in preventing government intervention to protect those lacking
either voice through internal corporate governance or effective
avenues to avoid dealing with the corporation, the more wealth those
in charge of the corporation have available to lobby.
Worse yet, corporate lobbying, if it results in government
facilitated monopoly---as, for example, through patent protection of
critical pharmaceuticals---not only blocks the government from
intervening on behalf of those lacking voice through internal
corporate governance but also limits democratic accountability
through disassociation. Indeed, the more monopoly power
corporations possess, the more wealth corporations may obtain to
influence government and the more corporations influence
government, the more monopoly power they may obtain to increase
their wealth and dictate the lives of those who lack a voice in their
governance.242
All told, to indulge in a bit of hyperbole, it is as if a thieves’ guild
used their ill-gotten loot to lobby government to reduce the funding
of police or to pass laws banning the manufacture and sale of locks.
C. The Choice
This brings us back again to the yin and yang of corporations and
democracy. In this instance, the dualism arises in a pair of tools to
address the potentially undemocratic impact of corporations on the
governance of society. Following the theme of this article, one tool
deals with the corporation’s relations with external government
while the other deals with internal corporate governance. Further
dualism arises in the potential for unintended consequences in both
of these approaches, which is reminiscent of the paradoxes
regarding corporations and democracy found in the history of
corporate law.
1.

Curbing Corporate Political Influence

Much writing243 and even more political posturing244 on the topic
of corporations and democracy advocate actions external to the
E.g., Zingales, supra note 2 at 119-120 (referring to this as the “Medici vicious circle”).
See note 3 supra.
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E.g., Press Release, Senator Bernie Sanders, Saving American Democracy Amendment (Dec.
8, 2011),
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/recent-business/saving-american-democracy-amendment
[https://perma.cc/H59S-4BP6]; S.J. Res. 33, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011) (Constitutional amendment
proposed by Senator Sanders to overturn Citizens United by declaring that Constitutional rights do
not belong to for-profit corporations).
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corporation to curb corporate political influence. Given the attitude
of a majority of the Supreme Court toward curbs on corporate
political activities and the difficulties of amending the Constitution,
this discussion can take on a sort of science fiction quality.245
Nevertheless, it is the purview of a law review article to talk about
what should be and not just what is.
Consistent with the theme of this article, the lodestar of our
discussion is pursuing democracy and democratic values. Hence, the
object is not to curb corporate political influence in order to advance
an agenda aiding employees, consumers, the environment or so on
because this is a better social outcome. Rather, it is to ensure
democratic consent and accountability when neither internal
corporate governance nor the individual ability to deal or not with
the corporation provides such. This means we must evaluate the
impact of corporate political influence not simply by whether it
succeeds or fails,246 but rather by whether it interferes with decision
making consistent with democratic values.
It turns out that the corporate part of corporate political influence
might be largely irrelevant when it comes addressing this inquiry.
To see why, consider the various ways in which corporate political
activity could be contrary to democratic norms.
The one on which there is the most agreement is corruption247--in other words, seeking influence through payments or actions
beneficial to government officials. With a sufficient quid pro quo
this can meet the definition of bribery;248 but it can be problematic
even if falling short of that.249 Getting into a discussion of
245

But see Levitt, supra note 6 (discussing openings left by Citizens United).
Of course, if corporate wealth rarely translates into political influence sufficient to change
government policy, then there is no reason to discuss whether corporate political influence is a threat
to democracy. In fact, there is some debate about the degree to which corporate or any other wealth
translates into political influence. While this is often asserted by those worried about the political
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Expensive, Failed Primary Campaigns, ABC NEWS, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/expensivefailed-primary-campaigns-past-decade/story?id=15483044 (January 31, 2012). There are also
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Yosifon, supra note 10 at 1203-04.
Ultimately, whether corporate or other wealth can yield political influence is an empirical
question, which this article will assume to be the case at least to some degree. Without delving into
the empirical evidence, there are a couple of grounds to support this assumption. The obvious is that
those whose money and elections are at stake must think it works. The other is that the Supreme
Court’s protection of such expenditures under the First Amendment would be rather pointless if the
Court did not assume such expenditures mattered.
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E.g., Khadija Lalani, McDonnell v. United States: Legalized Corruption and the Need For
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corruption, campaign finance and the like is well beyond the scope
of this article. Fortunately, it is also unnecessary. This is because it
is difficult to understand why the individual versus corporate source
of a potentially corrupt action should make any difference.250
The use of greater wealth to gain greater political influence raises
an issue beyond simply the prospect for corruption. In a society with
unequally distributed wealth, the ability of those with greater wealth
to have greater influence arguably offends the democratic value of
equality among voters and, many argue, endangers continued
democratic government.251 The acceptance of these arguments is
much more contentious.252 Fortunately, again, it is unnecessary to
get into this debate. While large corporations are wealthy, they are
not unique in that regard.253
This article discussed above a problem that does, at first glance,
seem to arise from corporations. Specifically, those in charge of a
corporation can use the wealth generated by its business to lobby
government against the interests of those who are also contributing
to this wealth but who are not in charge. In this manner, those in
charge might be able to use their control over wealth to which others
have voluntarily or involuntarily contributed in order to escape any
democratic accountability to those impacted by their decisions and
who helped create this wealth.
This, however, is not a problem limited to corporate expenditures.
For one thing, it arises with all businesses regardless of whether they
operate in corporate or non-corporate form. Moreover, to the extent
that those controlling corporations (managers, majority
shareholders, or shareholders more generally) personally obtain
money from the corporation through dividends, stock buybacks,
compensation packages or otherwise, they still could use income to
which others have contributed in order to lobby government for
250
To illustrate, consider the corrupting influence of employment of former government officials
by those they regulated while in government (the “revolving door” problem). It should hardly matter
if such employment is by a corporation or by a law firm organized as an LLP, which firm represents
those regulated by the agency at which the former official worked.
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actions favoring their interests over the interests of others impacted
by their decisions and who helped create this wealth.254
All of this is to suggest that Citizens United’s rejection of
categorical treatment of corporations when it comes to political
speech is not the problem. Indeed, in many ways it might be the
solution. If one could limit (despite Buckley) the use of wealth in
political speech, placing corporations within the same limit as any
individual would remove the advantage of corporations which hold
more wealth than individuals. At the same time, placing individuals
under the cap imposed on corporations more completely addresses
the problem of using wealth to lobby against the interests of those
who also contributed to its creation but have no voice in its use.
In fact, one might argue that the problem of using corporate (or,
more broadly, business) income to lobby against the interests of
those who contributed to its creation but have no voice in its use can
justify some cap on the use of money in political speech even if one
does not accept the voter equality rationale. Unfortunately, there is
a degree of circularity in this argument. This is because the thieves’
guild metaphor used earlier begs the question.
This metaphor assumes that various parties contributing to the
wealth under the control the stockholder majority and corporate
management, like the thieves’ victims, not only lack a democratic
voice through internal corporate governance, but also lack
democratic consent and accountability through their ability to deal
or not deal with the corporation. Hence, a predicate question from a
democratic values standpoint is whether some externality, market
failure or the like exists---a topic on which there is often a difference
of opinion in specific situations.255 Moreover, even if there is some
externality or market failure removing democratic consent or
accountability through individual choice, this does not mean that
decisions by those in charge of corporations were necessarily
contrary to the interests of other corporate stakeholders or that
government action would be better for them. Again, these are
questions on which there is often a difference of opinion in specific
situations.256
Hence, limiting the ability of those in charge of corporations to
use corporate wealth to lobby against regulation or the like, on the
ground that this is a misuse of wealth against the interests of
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nonconsenting parties who contributed to its creation, to some extent
curbs the ability of those in charge of corporations to make the case
that this is not true in the situation at hand. The result could be that
instead of promoting democratic decision making, we might be
interfering with it. On the other hand, there is a difference between
allowing expenditures to make one’s case and rewarding those able
to prevail in an unlimited spending arm’s race by using money
extracted from the opposition in the race. In other words, there is a
difference between barring for-profit corporations from some types
of political speech (as in Citizens United) and imposing reasonable
caps on how much one can spend.
2.

Democratizing Corporate Democracy

The alternate approach looks to the internal governance of
corporations. It takes advantage of the separation of ownership and
control embedded in the corporate governance model of an elected
board in order to institute reforms that might be more difficult in
businesses, such as partnerships, in which the owners personally
govern.257 The goal is to have corporate governance follow
democratic values. This would render government intervention to
protect those lacking voice through internal corporate governance
unnecessary to assuring democratic accountability.
To pursue this alternative, we need to address the anti-democratic
features in current corporate election mechanics, such as the lack of
access to the corporation’s proxy solicitation by nominees other than
those picked by the incumbent directors. More fundamentally (and
challenging) is to end the pay-to-play essence of corporate or
shareholder democracy. This requires extending the right to vote for
corporate directors to non-shareholders who are impacted by the
decisions of directors.
In fact, a number of countries do this to some extent. Their laws
grant employees the right to elect a certain number of the directors.
This is commonly referred to as co-determination because both
shareholders and employees determine the composition of the board
and thus have a voice in the overall governance of the corporation.
Germany pioneered co-determination laws, which are also found in
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a number of other European countries258 and China.259 Such laws
typically allow employees to elect a minority of the corporation’s
directors (such as one-third); albeit employees elect one-half of the
directors in the largest German companies.260 Perhaps prompted by
proposals made by Senator Elizabeth Warren and others during the
2020 election campaign,261 some scholars have recently advocated
adoption of co-determination for corporations in the United
States.262
While co-determination would move corporate governance
toward more democratic norms, it does not fully address the pay-toplay system. Co-determination, at least as adopted by other countries
so far, never gives employees as much power on the board as the
shareholders.263 More broadly, this leaves out a voice in corporate
governance for others impacted by the decisions of those in charge
of corporations. This includes consumers, lenders, and the overall
community in which the corporation operates.
In their article arguing for co-determination,264 Grant Hayden and
Matthew Bodie attempt to distinguish employees and shareholders
from these other interested groups based upon the criteria of how
much stake the group has in the corporation and the administrative
practicality of determining eligibility to vote. On the other hand, the
existence of various consumer governed cooperatives---such as
mutual insurance companies,265 credit unions,266 consumer coop
stores267---illustrates that it is mechanically possible in some
situations for consumers to have a voice.
From time to time, corporate law scholars have floated proposals
for corporate boards composed of directors representing multiple
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constituencies.268 At this point, complexity increases exponentially.
For example, who would vote for the directors representing those
potentially injured by corporate pollution?269
In any event, this still leaves the problem of voting in proportion
to stock, rather than one-person, one-vote. Perhaps the law could
mandate a one-person, one-vote system when it comes to voting by
shareholders. Not only is this the rule barring agreement to the
contrary for partnerships,270 but it was also the system for many
early corporations.271
Actually, shareholder voting by the amount of stock owned
versus one-person, one-vote will not matter as much in a corporation
whose board is elected by multiple constituencies rather than just by
the shareholders. This is because the primary practical impact of
voting by shares rather than one-person, one-vote occurs in the
corporation with a majority or otherwise controlling shareholder.
Under the current corporate governance system, control by a
majority shareholder looks more like autocratic or dictatorial rule
than what comes to mind when speaking of shareholder democracy.
In a system in which shareholders no longer control the majority of
the board, such autocracy is no longer a given.272
One could avoid many of the complexities of multi-stakeholder
elected boards by having the government appoint those in charge of
businesses over a certain size---in other words, nationalization or
socialism. The common objection is that government control of
corporations often leads to politically motivated or outright corrupt
decisions, lack of innovation, and economic inefficiency.273
Staying with the focus of this article on corporations and
democracy, the overlap of nationalization or socialism with non-
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democratic or outright totalitarian regimes274 raises an obvious
concern. Of course, correlation is not causation and so government
control over corporations in many notorious dictatorial regimes does
not prove that such socialism promotes dictatorial regimes as
opposed to the other way around. This is more so since government
control of many large firms is also found in democratic countries.275
In any event, it would unduly extend the length of this article to
address the arguments by those such as Hayek that government
control over major industries inevitably leads to undemocratic
governments.276
All told, any effort to democratize corporate governance by
attacking the pay-to-play system raises complex questions and the
potential for unintended consequences. Accordingly, it is useful to
keep in mind that human institutions are imperfect, and democracy
is commonly a matter of more versus less. Hence, much as the
history of democracy in general is a history of expanding voting
rights to different groups, expanded voting rights in corporations
might start with co-determination and gradually work to include
other stakeholders.
V.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between corporations and democracy involves
both the internal governance of corporations and the external impact
of corporations on the overall governance of society. This stems
from the reality that those in charge of corporations make decisions
that significantly impact individuals in society. If the governance of
society is to be truly democratic, then those making decisions for
corporations must have some consent by or accountability to the
individuals impacted by their decisions.
Despite some democratic features, corporate or shareholder
democracy as currently conceived is inconsistent with fundamental
democratic values and thus fails at this task---a function perhaps of
economic utilitarianism prevailing over democratic ideals. The
ability of individuals to deal or refuse to deal with a particular
corporation provides such consent and accountability in many, if not
the bulk, of instances. Nevertheless, externalities and market
failures leave significant gaps. In this event, the availability of
intervention by a democratically elected government of a political
274
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entity is necessary to restore accountability. Here is the real
democratic deficit potentially created by Citizens United: If those
controlling corporations, who are not democratically accountable
through internal corporate governance, can make unlimited use of
corporate resources to influence government against such
intervention, they could also lack accountability through the actions
of democratically elected governments of political entities.
For corporations to be part of, rather than antithetical to, the
democratic governance of society, we face a choice: Either there
should be some cap on the use resources generated by the
corporation to lobby against government intervention protecting the
interests of those lacking representation through corporate
democracy, or else we should reform corporate democracy to be
consistent with democratic values---or perhaps a bit of both.

